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past is infinitely distant from today. That is, we cannot say that an infinitely many days have elapsed to this point. The past, like the future, is
only potentially infinite. But though the only meaningful projections of
the future are finite (any future day is temporally finite from now), that
does not entail a future terminal event. Similarly, the only meaningful
projections of the past are finite (any past day is temporally finite from
now), but that does not entail an initial event.
But as C&C point out, though this is true if one counts from the present
to the past, the problem is that one has to "complete" an infinite to get to
the present if there is no beginning. Rundle's reply that any event-a meteor hitting the earth n years ago-is only finitely distant does not address
the problem of getting to the present where there is no starting point. Rundle mistakenly thinks that the problem is epistemic, not ontological.
For Rundle, without an initial event, nothing comes to be and thus
nothing needs explanation, for continuing in being is not something that
requires explanation. Indeed, "since there is no time at which the universe
might not have existed, it is not possible that the universe should not have
existed, so it exists of necessity" (p. 183). So in effect, with the necessity of
the universe we have an end to explanations. The principle of sufficient
reason is still true; it is just that it does not apply to the universe. The
universe is a posteriori necessary. So whereas Craig's argument rests on
the contention that the universe must have had a beginning because there
can be no actual infinite, Rundle contends that the universe did not have a
beginning but is not actually infinite either. In effect, he seeks to avoid the
dilemma with which C&C conclude their book.
This short summary can only allude to the subtle and dialogical philosophical reasoning found in both books. Since Craig has a penchant for
engaging his opponents in debate, both in situ and in print, one might
expect an ensuing volume where the two actually go head to head. The
interesting question will then concern what kind of dialogue is possible
between a Wittgensteinian and a realist.

The Divine Lawmaker: Lectures on Induction, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God, by John Foster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. ix and
191. $45 (hardcover).
GRAHAM OPPY, Monash University
In this fascinating book, John Foster develops a novel argument for the
existence of God on the basis of considerations about inductive inference
and laws of nature. The key claim that Foster defends is this: that regularities in the behaviour of physical objects in different times and places are
only satisfactorily explained on the assumption that the Judaeo-Christian
God's causal imposition of regularities qua regularities on the physical
universe brings it about that the operation of the physical universe is
partly governed by natural laws. On Foster's account, for there to be a
law of nature is for there to be a certain type of natural regularity of
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which it is true that it is nomically necessary that things are regular in
that way; and for there to be a certain type of natural regularity of which
it is true that it is nomically necessary that things are regular in that way,
there must be something that causally imposes this regularity on the universe qua regularity, i.e., in a way that leaves open all of the details of how
things conform to that regularity.
Foster's book begins with some considerations about the justification
of 'inductive inferences,' e.g., of predictions about the future on the basis
of past regularities. In the face of the realisation that it is not easy to see
how inductive inference admits of 'rational justification,' there are various responses that philosophers have essayed. Foster discusses: arguments
from past success-dismissed on the grounds that they are question-begging; pragmatic justifications-dismissed on the grounds that they do not
provide rational grounds for belief that past regularities are projectible;
the claim that inductive inference is constitutive of rationality-dismissed on
the grounds that this suggestion fails to capture the normative dimension
of rationality; arguments from a priori principles of probability-dismissed
on diverse grounds that I shall not attempt to summarize here; and the
claim that inductive inference is a basic form of sound reasoning whose rationality should just be taken for granted-dismissed on the grounds that there
are cases in which this assumption counts inferences as rational which
are, in fact, manifestly irrational. (I think that Foster's dismissal of pragmatic justifications is too quick; he fails to consider the role that doxastic
conservatism-and the principle that outlaws negative undermining of
beliefs-might play in resisting sceptical overtures. More importantly, I
think that Foster's objection to the claim that inductive inference is basic
also fails, because the case that he takes to defeat the proposal is crucially
under-described: once we have information about the probabilities that are
attributed to, for example, the claims that are assumed to be known, the
difficulties that Foster claims to detect simply evaporate).
Next, Foster presents what he takes to be the 'core' of the correct (nomological-explanatory) solution to lithe problem of justifying inductive
inferences." This account has two key aspects. First, it claims that observed regularities justify an inference to the best explanation of the obtaining of those regularities, viz., the obtaining of natural laws that nomically necessitate the obtaining of those regularities. And, second, it claims
that the prediction of the obtaining of future instances of the regularities
is now a matter of deductive inference (from the laws, perhaps together
with information about standing conditions). In order to meet obvious
prima facie objections to this analysis, Foster insists (at least pro tem) that
this account only applies to regularities "in the physical world," and not
to regularities that pertain to human psychology and the like; and he
also insists (at least pro tem) that this account is not intended to handle
'probabilistic laws.' As Foster notes, a broadly similar account of laws of
nature is defended by David Armstrong (and by Michael Tooley and Fred
Dretske); one chapter of Foster's book is devoted to a very interesting
critique of Armstrong's views.
Foster provides detailed responses to two prima facie plausible objections to the nomological-explanatory solution to lithe problem of justifying inductive inferences." First, in response to the suggestion that there
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is no reason to suppose that there is anything in the pattern of regularities-simply in virtue of the regularities that are exhibited -that calls for
an explanation, Foster appeals (in effect) to Dembski's 'explanatory filter': given that the regularities are both' specified' and sufficiently highly
improbable, we cannot reasonably suppose that they are just a matter of
chance. Second, in response to the observation that time-restricted laws
would fit the data just as well as universal laws-and, hence, to the claim
that we don't really have here a non-question-begging solution to "the
problem of justifying inductive inferences" -Foster claims that, despite
the apparent tension, rationality demands both rejection of unexplained
regularities and rejection of capricious necessities.
Despite the evident attraction that the proposal has for him, Foster
finds one serious prima facie difficulty for the nomological-explanatory solution to "the problem of justifying inductive inferences," namely, that it
requires that the laws are both 'nomically' necessary and 'strictly' or 'logically' contingent. ("For any law [of nature], we surely have to acknowledge that there are possible worlds in which that law does not obtain" (p.
83).) I think that it is not nearly so obvious as Foster supposes that this is
so. True enough, if we suppose that there are actually laws of nature, then
there is no doubt that there are doxastically possible 'compositionally relevant' worlds in which there are counter-instances to those laws: we can
conceive of worlds in which those laws fail. But, unless we suppose that
conceivability is a good guide to alethic possibility, it is hard to see why
we should not suppose that the actual laws are all alethically necessary.
[ndeed, if we do not suppose that conceivability is a good guide to alethic
possibility, then it is hard to see why we should not suppose that the various regularities that the laws are intended to explain are alethically necessary. Since it isn't easy to explain why conceivability is a good guide to
alethic possibility, I take it that there is a real difficulty here to which Foster
gives insufficient attention.
Foster considers, and dismisses, various naturalistic accounts of the
modal standing of laws of nature. In particular, he very briefly considers
the Shoemaker-Swoyer account of properties-according to which certain
dispositions are essential to the identity of non-dispositional properties;
he even more briefly considers Ellisian dispositional essentialism - according to which laws of nature turn out to be strict necessities because
basic natural kinds are constitutively dispositional in character; and, at
somewhat greater length, he considers the suggestion that laws are "concrete entities that govern the world causally." I think that Foster's dismissal of the first two alternatives is too swift: given the conclusions for which
he aims, he ought to have given these proposals more extensive scrutiny.
(Of course, that's not to say that he is-or that he is not-mistaken in the
conclusions that he draws.)
Foster also considers, and dismisses, various naturalistic attempts to
account for the regularities at issue without adverting to natural laws.
In particular, he considers: the suggestion that, for any given regularity,
there is a lower-level regularity that explains why the given regularity
obtains; the proposal that the relevant regularities are to be explained in
terms of the dispositions of physical objects; and the suggestion that there
might be some kind of naturalistic causal explanation of the obtaining of
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these regularities. Against the first proposal, Foster claims that, even if
specific regularities were all explained in terms of lower-level regularities, it would not follow that "the overall regularity of the world is self-explanatory" (p. 114). No doubt this is so. Nothing can be self-explanatory:
"A because A:' is always an explanatory solecism. But why shouldn't we
think that, if there are regularities "all the way down," then there is no
problem about "the justification of inductive inference"? Against the second proposal, Foster objects that even if we can make sense of the notion
of an autonomous disposition-i.e., of a disposition that does not depend
upon an underlying law of nature-the existence of individual autonomous dispositions cannot explain collective regularities: we still have "no
explanation of why different objects of the same intrinsic type have the
same dispositions" (p. 115). And, against the third proposal, Foster claims
that there is no way that any natural mechanism can causally dispose
objects to behave in relevantly regular ways at different times, even if it is
true that aspects of the structure of the world at a time can causally dispose things to behave in the relevant regular ways at that time.
In tl1e face of the foregoing discussion, Foster holds that the only live
alternative is to suppose that the existence of the relevant explanations is
to be explained in terms of the deeds of a supernatural (personal) agent.
Foster takes it for granted-on the basis of his previous work-that some
kind of Cartesian dualism is true, so that there is no conceptual difficulty
in supposing that there are supernatural agents that can act directly on the
physical world via their intentions. Moreover, Foster also assumes without argument that freedom is properly given a libertarian analysis, and
that human agents have libertarian freedom. He then sets himself the task
of figuring out the properties of the supernatural (personal) agent correctly invoked in the explanation of the relevant regularities, guided by the
methodological precepts that one ought to avoid unnecessary complexity,
and that one ought to minimise residual sources of puzzlement.
According to Foster, it is most plausible to maintain-simply on the basis of the relevant regularities-that there is a single supernatural agent that
caused the whole of the physical universe to exist, that is the creator of people, and that is causally primitive. Moreover, he also argues that it is most
plausible to suppose-again, on the basis of the relevant regularities-that
there is no temporal limitation on the extent of the existence of this supernatural agent; that any degreed attributes that are possessed by this supernatural agent are possessed 'to the highest degree' -so that, in particular,
this agent is perfectly rational, maximally knowledgeable and maximally
powerful; and that this supernatural agent is perfectly good. (In order to
get the last of these claims, Foster assumes-again without argument-that
morality is objective and that moral claims are rationally overriding.)
Faced with the objection that the conclusions that he draws conflict
with the guiding precepts that he invokes, Foster observes that it is bound
to be the case that there are questions that have no answers, unless one
supposes that the terminus of explanation has some kind of necessity.
Consequently, he countenances the suggestion that his supernatural agent
is a necessary existent, while nonetheless insisting that it need not follow
from this allowance that there is a successful ontological argument. Here,
I think that there are serious questions to be raised. On Foster's account,

BOOK REVIEWS

115

there are many different universes that God might have made: we are not
to suppose that the existence of our universe is necessary. Furthermore,
since God has libertarian freedom, there are possible worlds in which God
makes those other universes. When we consider a particular regularity in
our universe, the existence of that regularity is explained in terms of God's
desire (or intention, or whatever) to make a universe in which that regularity is instantiated. Moreover, when we compare our actual world with a
world in which God makes a universe in which some other regularity obtains, ex hypothesi, there is no explanation in either world of why God has
the one set of desires (or intentions, or whatever) rather than the other. So,
it seems, the naturalist is being asked to trade in (putatively) unexplained
regularities in the universe for unexplainable desires (or intentions, or
whatever) in God. I do not think that naturalists should accept this deal:
if you really think that there must be a satisfying explanation for the holding of the regularities-one that does avoid unnecessary complexities and
that minimizes residual sources of puzzlement-then you have very good
reason to deny that Foster has found it.
In the second last chapter of the book, Foster provides a defense of his
causal account of laws, and in particular, of the view that God's creative
activities should be viewed in terms of the imposition of regularities qua
regularities that create laws, and not in terms of the direct creation of the
physical universe in all of its details. In particular, Foster claims that if
God creates the entire universe directly, then the only way that God can
ensure the truth of individual counterfactuals-e.g., that this particular
crystal glass would break if it were dropped-is by ensuring that had he
decided to create the universe in a way that made the antecedent of this
counterfactual true, then he would also have decided to create in a way
that made its consequent true as well. But, according to Foster, this won't
do, since "the only disposition involved is the one that characterises God,
and this makes no difference ... to how things are with the glass" (p. 164).
This argument strikes me as odd. Given that God has libertarian freedom,
I don't see how God could ensure that had he decided to create the universe in a way that made the antecedent of this counterfactual true, then
he would also have decided to create in a way that made its consequent
true as well; but, in any case, no matter what God does, it surely can still
be true that, in all of the nearest possible worlds in which the glass is
dropped, it breaks-i.e., there is no reason at all to suppose that there
is something more that God must do in order to ensure that the relevant
counterfactual is true.
In the last chapter, Foster tidies up some loose ends. He offers an account of 'probabilistic laws' -or, more exactly, of ersatz probabilistic
laws-and defends the proposal that all laws should properly be understood to include an exclusion clause: when God makes laws, these laws
can always have the form of causing it to be the case that Fs are Gs except
in cases in which God intervenes subsequently to make it the case that
particular Fs are not Gs. Moreover, he claims that it is a 'safe assumption'
that God would not create laws of this kind unless he intends "to leave
the world to follow its law-ordained course in at least the vast majority
of cases" (p. 181). Even if we accept this contention, we might wonder
why we should suppose that God must ordain laws that are universal:
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if God could ordain laws that are local to places and times, then we still
don't have the promised "justification of inductive inferences." Here, interestingly, Foster adverts to a 'noseeum' inference: it is hard to think of
anything that might give God a reason to restrict the scope of laws, so it
is reasonable to give some credence to the thought that there isn't anything that might give God such a reason. Given his confidence about his
"knowledge of the mind of God/' it is interesting to speculate about what
Foster would say in response to evidential arguments from evil: it is, after
alt hard to believe that regularities involving evil and brutality are compelling evidence for the goodness of his postulated supernatural agent.
Foster says no more than that the needed account would "make a long
story" (p. 145).
Overall, it seems to me that this book has similar virtues (and drawbacks) to work that Foster-and Howard Robinson, to whom the book is
dedicated - have done on other topics. On the one hand, Foster's critiques
of particular naturalistic theories are typically penetrating, and executed
with considerable skill: consider, again, his critique of Armstrong's theory
of laws in the present work. On the other hand, because the major step
in the argument for his preferred theistic alternative is simply that the
naturalistic theories that he has examined are all defective in one way or
another, there are various ways in which that argument is weak. First-as
I noted in my earlier remarks about God's creative desires (or intentions,
or whatever)-there is the worry that when Foster's theories are examined
by the same stringent criteria that are applied to the competing naturalistic theories, it will be pretty clear that they do no better in withstanding
critical scrutiny. If we are to take a ride in the critical taxicab, we have no
option but to ride it all the way to its destination: once there, it is almost
inevitable that we shall reach the view that any theory that people have
formulated thus far is capable of improvement in important respects; the
more so if we set the bar for the assessment of theories sufficiently high.
Second, it is clear that those who suppose that there are plenty of good,
independent reasons to prefer naturalism to theism needn't be especially
disheartened by telling criticisms of particular naturalistic theories: there
are naturalistic theories that Foster dismisses without due consideration;
and, of course, there are naturalistic theories-including hitherto unformulated naturalistic theories-that he fails to consider at all.

